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REFLECTIONS 
ANTITRUST REFORM FOR 
JOINT PRODUCTION VENTURES1 
Joel B. Eisen2 
I. PICKING "WINNERS AND LOSERS" 
AND A LESSON FROM "BAMBI" 
This January, the U.S. Memories consortium dissolved when it failed to 
attract a sufficient initial investment. U.S. Memories would have brought to-
gether America's largest computer and semiconductor manufacturers, at a 
start-up cost of approximately $1 billion, to manufacture 4-megabit dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM) semiconductor chips with IBM-licensed 
technology. Some commentators argue that antitrust concerns led to U.S. 
Memories' demise and could frustrate the rise of additional joint production 
ventures (JPV s). Should the government intervene and relax the antitrust laws 
to support JPV s? That was the question posed in hearings before a congressio-
nal subcommittee in 1989 on four antitrust reform bills. 3 
In another development last year, millions of Americans saw "Bambi," 
released for the first time on videocassettes. For those who missed it, a brief 
review is in order. In the forest, Bambi blossoms under his mother's care, but 
loses her to a hunter's rifle. Bambi's powerful father, the king of the forest, 
takes the young fawn under his tutelage. Bambi grows rapidly into a strong 
young deer, ready to assume leadership of the forest. As the movie closes, 
10 1990 by Joel B. Eisen. 
2Republican Counsel, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee ori Science, 
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives. This article would not have been possible 
without the generous assistance of James Paul, Jim Turner, Christine Wegman, Fran D'Amico, 
Anne Marie Sweeney, and especially Tamar R. Schwartz, my editor for life. The views repre-
sented in this article are my own, and should not be construed as reflecting the views of the House 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee. I am responsible for any errors of fact and omissions 
or misstatements. 
3Pending Antitrnst Legislation on Production Joint Ventures: Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., lst 
Sess. ( 1989) [hereinafter, respectively, May 17 Judiciary Hearing, July 26 Judiciary Hearing, and 
Sept. 28 Judiciary Hearing) (unpublished testimony on file with the author). 
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Bambi stands beside his father on a knoll overlooking the forest. Heroic music 
swells in the background. 
The forest's prosperity depends, apparently, on maintaining a "deer-
ocracy." Bambi's father, after all, grooms him, not any other animal, to take 
over the forest. The average "Bambi" viewer hardly stops to wonder whether 
that's desirable. We're so teary-eyed that we cannot contemplate that Bambi's 
father could be doing something wrong. I don't mean to alienate America's 
children. "Bambi" should end as it does: everything turns out fine in Holly-
wood. But if we should learn anything from "Bambi," it's that only in the 
movies should we encourage picking the leader in advance. 
Few would imagine that "Bambi" bears any relationship to America's in-
dustrial policy. Yet substitute "the modem marketplace" for the forest, 
"American companies" for the forest animals, "the Japanese and other well-
equipped competitors'' for the hunters, and ''prosperity, jobs, and national se-
curity" for the warm ending of the film. The threat of the "hunters" is real. 
Since 1980, the Japanese market share in the semiconductor industry has dou-
bled. By 1988, Japanese firms had tripled their world market share of sales of 
one-megabit DRAMs, a central component of computers and television sets, 
and sold 73.3 percent of world production.' 
For decades, policymakers have argued over the scope of the federal gov-
ernment's response, whether it takes the form of direct support or indirect as-
sistance (e.g., tax credits) to high-technology companies. The sharpest debate 
today is over proposals in new technologies such as high-definition television 
(HDTV) and superconductivity, which favor funding consortia with "seed 
money." For example, Reps. George Brown (D-Cal.), Don Ritter (R-Pa.), 
and Norman Mineta (D-Cal.) amended H.R. 3042, which authorizes technol-
ogy programs in the Department of Commerce, to fund $100 million for each 
of the next three years in HDTV. Reps. Brown and Ritter had introduced sepa-
rate legislation, H.R. 1516 and H.R. 1267, respectively, calling for funding 
for HDTV. 
In current Washington-speak, opponents term such assistance "industrial 
policy,'' and say the government is ''picking winners and losers.'' There is 
some appeal to their arguments. Washington may bolster critical industries. It 
should refrain as much as possible, though, from deciding in advance which 
firms in the industry will succeed. This is a better job for the private sector, 
where the crucible of competition weeds out unsuccessful firms. Washington 
bureaucrats are rarely familiar enough with the nuts and bolts of an industry to 
make decisions that determine individual firms' success. 
The prevailing response is apparent. Increasingly, policymakers are 
adopting the view that the federal government should play a greater role in halt-
ing America's decline in industrial leadership. As Clyde Prestowitz, the 
'Telephone conversation with Ms. Eva Jack, Semiconductor Industry Association (Jan. 19, 
1990). 
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former trade negotiator, notes, "Continued American power is critical for 
world peace, prosperity, and stability.' ,s Perfect free trade is no longer possi-
ble, given current global competition. Our competitors take actions that protect 
their high-tech industries at the expense of free trade. Even now, our federal 
government aids ailing industries. It may protect an entire industry with a tar-
iff. It spends tens of billions of dollars each year on research that may resusci-
tate an industry, or create an entire new one, such as artificial intelligence, 
largely a creation of research sponsored by the Defense Department. It may 
provide a market for an industry's products, which may ensure the success of 
individual companies. One notable example is the aerospace industry, which 
benefits tremendously from defense-oriented procurement. 
Some fear, however, that government subsidies and assistance groom in-
dividual firms for success, repressing others. The argument is that benefits ex-
tended to consortia give them a leg up on other startup firms. 6 Several witnesses 
at the Science, Space, and Technology Committee hearing in March on HDTV 
proposals implied that assistance for U.S. television makers would give a 
windfall to Zenith, the only remaining "U.S. manufacturer. " 7 Rep. Mel 
Levine (D-Cal.) and Rep. Ritter, two proponents of funding consortia, respond 
that "industry-led" strategy resembles other governmental actions that influ-
ence outcomes in high-tech industries less than competition between firms. In-
dividual aerospace companies, for instance, succeeded as a result of govern-
ment policies. These policies do not target a specific company. The 
competitive bidding process theoretically enables all to participate, and in the 
beginning, the Boeings and Lockheeds (the eventual "winners") competed 
with other companies. 
Picking "winners" before the fact would be another story altogether, one 
that would resemble Bambi's father's actions in anointing Bambi as the forest 
leader. Of course, "Bambi" is a limited model. In the movie, the hunters' first 
threat was not an invasion of the forest-they shot Bambi's mother in the open 
field. Our hunter-competitors are already in the forest and shooting. There's 
another critical difference between "Bambi" and the debate over American 
industrial policy: the other firms, unlike the forest animals, are banding to-
gether, without Washington's help, to produce high-tech products. Should the 
antitrust laws encourage this activity? The ultimate answer depends on whether 
antitrust reform, like ''Bambi,'' picks winners in advance. 
sc.v. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD 
315 (1988). 
6See, e.g., Barfield, It's Still High-Definition Intervention, Wall St. J., May 8, 1989, at AlO 
("The problem is that while industry may 'pick the winners,' the government is still expected to 
provide the resources and policies to ensure that the winners are winners"). 
7 High Definition Television: Hearing Before the House Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology, lOlst Cong., l st Sess. ( 1989) [hereinafter HD1V hearing]. Designating Zenith a U.S. 
company plays fast and loose with the definition, because Zenith assembles television sets in Mex-
ico, whereas several "foreign" television companies maintain plants in the U.S. See the discussion 
of what constitutes a "United States company," infra note 62, and accompanying text. 
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II. THE ANTITRUST LAWS: HOSTILE OR NEUTRAL? 
Professor Tom Jorde, among others, argues that American companies do 
not form "strategic alliances," meaning ventures working together toward 
joint production, because of "a reluctance due to hostile U.S. antitrust laws. " 8 
Those laws might impose a penalty of treble damages and attorneys' fees on a 
JPV, under the ''rule of reason' ' test, if a court finds that the benefits to compe-
tition do not outweigh the harm done. 9 Prof. Jorde and others propose partial or 
complete relief for JPVs from those penalties. But antitrust reform could give 
us paternalism, not competition. In that case, the reform proposals, arising 
from the rallying cry of "competitiveness" and a perception of the need for 
antitrust reform, could be costly. 
The National Cooperative Research and Development Act of 1984w ex-
tended limited protection from the antitrust laws under a "notification" ap-
proach. Research joint ventures that notify the Justice Department of their 
planned activities cannot be held per se illegal, and are only liable for actual, 
not treble, damages in antitrust suits. Approximately 130 ventures have filed 
registrations, including Sematech, the Austin-based semiconductor consor-
tium. In 1984, Congress recognized that JPVs were beyond the scope of this 
protection. Section 2(b)(2) of the NCRA excludes agreements regarding pro-
duction or marketing, other than those regarding dissemination of proprietary 
information that ventures generate. There are bills pending before the House 
Judiciary Committee to close that gap. Rep. Tom Campbell (R-Cal.) and Rep. 
Rick Boucher (D-Va.) struck first with H.R. 1024, the "National Cooperative 
Innovation and Commercialization Act of 1989. ' ' H. R. 1024, in part a product 
of Prof. Jorde's work, adopts the "certification" approach of the Export Trad-
ing Company Act of 1982. 11 
Under H.R. 1024, a "cooperative innovation arrangement" would apply 
to the Justice Department for a certificate of approval. With this certificate, a 
JPV could produce a product and market it without fear of incurring an antitrust 
8Jorde & Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust: Balancing Competition and Coopera-
tion, HIGH TECH. L.J. 25 (1989). The relevant laws include section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and section 2 of the same 
Act, which prohibits monopolization of markets. 15 U.S. C. § § 1, 2 (1982). Certain activities, such 
as price-fixing, are per se, or automatic Sherman Act violations. No court has held a JPV illegal per 
se. The court would apply a second test, the ''rule of reason'' test, unless it is implausible that the 
venture will have any procompetitive impact. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Association 
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Jorde, supra, at 38-39 
("the [recent Supreme Court cases] permit a confident conclusion that rule of reason analysis 
rather than per se illegality should apply if there is a plausible claim that cooperation is needed for 
innovation and its commercialization.''). The ''rule of reason'' requires a weighing of the relevant 
circumstances of a case, including the structure of the market involved, to decide whether a JPV 
restrains competition unreasonably. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
447 (1986). 
9 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). 
t015 U .S.C. § 4301 et seq. (1982). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. (1982). Ileave for another day the intriguing question of the desir-
ability of the ETCA as a model for antitrust reform. 
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suit. The other bills retain the availability of judicial relief. Rep. Don Edwards 
(D-Cal.), who introduced the original NCRA, launched H.R. 1025, which 
would extend the NCRA's protection to ventures that engage in "the produc-
tion, marketing, or distribution of any product, process, or service" and that 
register with the Justice Department. 12 Rep. Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.), the 
Ranking Republican Member of the Judiciary Committee, weighed in with 
H.R. 2664, which also extends the NCRA, but not to marketing (as does H.R. 
1025). Rep. Ron Wyden (D-Or.), who chairs a subcommittee of the House 
Small Business Committee, introduced H.R. 423, the "Joint Manufacturing 
Opportunities Act of 1989,'' which targets smaller ventures. Debate in the Ju-
diciary Committee focuses on H.R. 1024 and the two "notification" bills. 13 
Antitrust reform is, however, only part of the ''competitiveness'' agenda. 
Reps. Ritter and Campbell, among others, have advanced broad "competitive-
ness" legislation. A bipartisan coalition has also advanced an "emerging tech-
nologies" bill that is under consideration in the Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy Committee. These bills feature initiatives to change the tax and intellectual 
property laws, fund consortia, and create a civilian "Department of Science 
and Technology" or its equivalent. Both the Administration and Congress 
view antitrust reform as one of the less controversial items on this list. 14 The 
recent battle over the capital gains tax, for example, has been far more nasty 
and divisive than the debate over antitrust reform. 
Bundling antitrust reform with other initiatives is not bad, unless it is 
something industry would "settle" for if other initiatives fail. If American 
businesses cannot compete because they pay a high price for investment capi-
tal, as some suggest, and because prevailing wage rates are too high, then 
''competitiveness'' packages should focus on deficit reduction, lowering inter-
est rates, and labor reform, not antitrust reform. Last May, Rep. Jack Brooks 
(D-Tex.), the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, put it acerbically: 
"I, for one, have had my fill of watching the antitrust laws used by some as the 
'whipping boy' for all the failed trade and fiscal policies of the past few 
years." 15 Columnist Robert Samuelson calls corporate complaints about Wash-
ington's policies a defeatist message of ''blaming others for our problems.'' 16 
This is an exaggeration, yet Samuelson may have a point: despite complaints to 
12H.R. 1025, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(b)(4)(E) (1989). 
13There may eventually be more bills; Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) and Strom Thurmond 
(R-S.C.) have introduced a bill that is identical to Representative Fish's bill. In the House, it is 
uncertain whether the Science, Space, and Technology Committee would also consider these mea-
sures. However, the Committee would probably have joint jurisdiction over the bills that amend 
the NCRA, since it has jurisdiction over civilian R&D and joined the Judiciary Committee in pass-
ing the original Act. 
14See, e.g., Easing of Antitrust Law is Sought, Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1989, at AIO 
("There is consensus on the approach ... "). 
15May 17 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Committee Chairman Jack 
Brooks). In fairness, there is little evidence that proponents view antitrust reform as anything other 
than a desirable component of "competitiveness" packages. 
16Samuelson, The Excuse Industry, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1989, at 74. 
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the contrary, it may be true that the antitrust laws do not prevent American 
firms from competing. Rep. Mike Synar (D-Okla.), a Judiciary Committee 
member, says, "There is no evidence that the alleged decline in the competi-
tiveness of American business can be traced to the antitrust laws. " 11 
III. FEAR OF ANTITRUST: A VOIDING TECHNOLOGY BY 
ACCLAIM 
Some groups are trying to persuade members of Congress otherwise. 
Lobbies such as the National Association of Manufacturers, Chamber of 
Commerce and seven other groups that issued a joint statement, 18 stress in-
dustry's "fear of antitrust." In their speeches, some Members of Congress 
have stated that businesses do not form JPV s for fear of violating the antitrust 
laws. In September, Attorney General Thornburgh asked whether fear of an-
titrust has kept American companies from attempting JPVs, and concluded 
that indeed it had. 19 
These claims deserve to be examined with a bit of skepticism. Inside the 
Beltway, words cascade through the information pipeline as if by Brownian 
motion, and today's speech is tomorrow's fact. This is especially likely with 
subjective issues: ''Do firms shy away from joint ventures for fear of the anti-
trust laws?" is more vulnerable to pronouncements embodying several 
shades of meaning than "What was Pennsylvania's agricultural output last 
year?" 
Prof. Jorde 's extensive and well-documented article cites no evidence for 
the "fear of antitrust." I doubt that venturers think of antitrust implications 
before they wade through their plans for product, profit, and marketing. 20 Anti-
trust considerations figure far less prominently in business decisions than basic 
11Easing of Antitrust Law is Sought, supra note 14. 
18 American Electronics Assn., et al., Antitrust Reform for Production Joint Ventures (Sept. 
18, 1989); see also Sept. 28 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3. 
19Remarks of Attorney General Richard Thornburgh at the Sixth Annual General Counsels 
Briefing, Washington, D.C. 7 (Sept. 20, 1989). In 1983, some of those testifying before Congress 
made the same claim. See Japanese Technological Advances and Possible United States Responses 
Using Research Joint Ventures: Hearing Before the House Commiltee on Science and Technology, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing) (statement of John Lacey, Executive 
Vice President for Technology and Planning, Control Data Corporation) ("[a] reason for the lack 
of cooperation in U.S. research and development [is] the fear of inadvertently violating our 
century-old antitrust laws ... "). 
2
°witnesses before Congress sometimes advance a possible explanation for this: executives 
are too reticent to disclose their fears. For example, during a hearing in 1983 on the bills that re-
sulted in the NCRA's passage, Mr. Steven Olson, the Associate General Counsel of Control Data 
Corp., told Congress that polling executives on the ''fear of antitrust'' would not yield much infor-
mation. 1983 Hearing, supra note 19, at 255-56 (testimony of Steven J. Olson). Yet then-Rep. 
Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tenn.) responded to Mr. Olson that the antitrust laws, while something to 
consider, are not as important as Mr. Olson would have one believe. Id. at 257 (''It was possible to 
create MCC without violating the antitrust laws. I did not try to make the point that it was going to 
be easy."). 
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free enterprise mechanics. Even reform proponents such as Dr. Jack Kuehler, 
President of IBM, acknowledge that "the primary activity of the competitive 
battlefield" is the effort of "companies, driven by the new competitive reali-
ties, [to] concentrate their individual efforts on speeding new products to mar-
ket. ... ,,21 
The U.S. Memories saga suggests that antitrust impacts do not make 
things easy for a JPV, but have less bite than considerations of the bottom line. 
Until U.S. Memories, the General Motors-Toyota automobile venture was the 
most visible JPV in America. The notoriety ofU .S. Memories would have vir-
tually guaranteed heightened antitrust scrutiny. 22 U.S. Memories' President, 
Sanford Kane, told the House Judiciary Committee last September 28 that 
"U.S. Memories should be able to go forward even in the absence of new anti-
trust legislation. " 23 Mr. Kane added that it was harder to attract investors be-
cause of the antitrust laws, but summarized his main problem as, "convinc-
[ing] a significant number of companies to undertake what is, after all, an 
inherently risky venture, against entrenched foreign competitors, in an indus-
try that is notoriously cyclical and rapidly evolving.' ' 24 
In the end, Mr. Kane was unable to overcome this obstacle. Although 
seven powerhouses announced their intentions to join, others including Apple 
Computer and Sun Microsystems did not. The stated reasons for the opt-out 
had nothing to do with the antitrust laws: there was speculation, for example, 
that fluctuating conditions in the DRAM market had persuaded some compan-
ies that the venture would not tum a profit. Some blamed the venture's goal. 
Scott McNealy, Sun's Chairman, argued that existing companies were better 
positioned to improve U.S. competitiveness in the DRAM market, and said 
that U.S. Memories was like ''pouring water on a desert in the hopes of regen-
erating a forest. " 25 Also, some companies apparently did not wish to offend 
their Japanese partners. 26 On January 15, 1990, Mr. Kane called off the venture 
for lack of sufficient financial commitments. In the wake of U.S. Memories' 
demise, should we believe other companies that say they're not joining to-
21 Sept. 28Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at 8 (testimony of Dr. Jack D. Kuehler, President, 
IBM Corporation). 
22In fact, T. J. Rodgers, CEO of the Silicon Valley firm Cypress Semiconductor, Inc., had 
threatened U.S. Memories with an antitrust suit if it expanded into the static random access mem-
ory (''SRAM'') market. Hill & Miller, Computer Firms Make Bold Pitch to Retake Market Lost to 
Japan, Wall St. J., June 22, 1989, Al [hereinafter, Re-Entry Vehicle]. 
23Sept. 28Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Sanford L. Kane, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Memories). 
24/d. at 12 (statement of Sanford L. Kane). 
25 U.S. Memories Folds Up, Cites Lack Of Interest, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at Dl. 
See also Contrasts On Chips, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at 020 ("From a short-term viewpoint, 
the falling prices made U.S. Memories appear unnecessary"). 
26See This Will Surely Come Back To Haunt Us, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 29, 1990, at 72-73 
("Some computer makers said privately they feared retaliation, particularly from Japanese chip-
makers, if they bought into the chipmaking consortium"); High Technology Firms Seek New Di-
rections for 1990s, Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1989, at A3. 
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gether because of a perceived antitrust challenge, when the real concern is the 
bottom line?21 
Because the NCRA does not protect JPVs, some say the damages in an 
antitrust lawsuit could be substantial. So even though the "fear of antitrust" 
may not be on the tip of a CEO's tongue, is it legitimate? The government's 
behavior suggests otherwise. The Justice Department has never challenged a 
JPV ... not even the mammoth GM-Toyota venture. 28 The 1988 version of its 
"Antitrust Guide For International Operations" states as a "general conclu-
sion" that "a very large proportion of international business transactions in-
volving American firms and/or American markets usually will not involve vio-
lations of U.S. antitrust laws .... " 29 Unless the JPV dominates a product 
market, or sets prices or markets its products jointly, the Justice Department 
will not intervene. 30 
As for private lawsuits, courts view horizontal agreements (those between 
competitors) with suspicion. The Supreme Court has concluded that even a 
venture that does not control enough of a market to monopolize it is not immune 
from antitrust liability. 31 Moreover, the "rule of reason," like any other "rea-
sonableness'' standard, seems to be a vague signal of potential liability. But in 
recent years, the appellate courts have adopted a market power "filter" for 
horizontal agreements. There is an emerging "safe harbor" for firms possess-
ing roughly the market share permitted by the Justice Department's Merger 
Guidelines for horizontal mergers, approximately 20-25 percent of the rele-
vant market. 32 
U.S. Memories planned to capture about 5-8 percent of the world DRAM 
27Intel Corp., which had joined U.S. Memories, dramatically underscored the fact that firms 
are not afraid of the antitrust consequences ofJPV s. On January 22, one week after U.S. Memories 
collapsed, Intel formed a joint venture with a Japanese firm to make and sell DRAMs. Its spokes-
person, Mr. Michael Maibach, indicated that the venture would have gone forward whether or not 
U.S. Memories failed. See Intel Links with Japanese to Secure DRAM Market, Washington Tech-
noloY('., Jan. 25, 1990, at 1. 
8A recent article chronicles the rise of JPVs. Since 1988, Merck & Co. and Johnson & John-
son have formed a venture to make over-the-counter medicines, Dow Chemical Co. and Eli Lilly & 
Co. have joined to operate an agricultural chemical venture, and General Electric Co. and Ford 
Motor Co. have agreed to develop automobile lighting systems. The Justice Department did not 
challenge any of these ventures. See Bush Aides Urge Antitrust Restrictions Be Eased for U.S. 
Firms' Joint Ventures, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1990, at A4. On February 7, 1990, Chrysler Corp. and 
General Motors Corp. announced the formation of New Venture Gear, Inc., a joint venture to 
manufacture automobile and truck transmissions. The proposal sailed through the Justice Depart-
ment's review, prompting Chrysler Vice Chairman Gerald Greenwald to note that, "It [antitrust 
considerations] no longer is a question that it was 15 to 20 years ago." See Standish, Joint Trans-
mission Venture to Begin Production Next Year, Associated Press, Feb. 7, 1990. 
29U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 4-5 (1988). 
30According to Professor Robert Pitofsky, Dean of the Georgetown Law School, "(JPVs] 
don't bother antitrusters as long as when you get down to the marketing phase, the consumers have 
a choice." Re-Entry Vehicle, supra note 22, at A7. 
31See, e.g., NCAA, 485 U.S. 85. 
32Jorde, supra note 8, at 43-45, and cases cited therein. Prof. Jorde adds that commentators 
have been heavily critical of the ''rule of reason'' for its lack of certainty. Id. at 39-41. Yet in the 
same discussion, he mentions the wide variety of cases demonstrating the ''safe harbor'' trend. Id. 
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market, which projects roughly to a 6-15 percent share of the American 
DRAM market. 33 The lower number is more likely, because U.S. makers have 
captured a smaller market share in each succeeding generation of DRAMs. 
Even that may have been an overly ambitious projection that did not take into 
account the qualms of computer industry executives about purchasing chips 
from an untried source. 34 But assuming that U.S. Memories did what it said it 
would do, its share of the DRAM market would not have come close to being an 
antitrust violation under the "safe harbor" interpretation. 35 
Consequently, a $1 billion investment, which looms large to smaller 
firms, is not always the grubstake of a monopolist. Whether or not Congress 
changes the antitrust laws, small-and even large-firms can band together 
now to make substantial investments in many industries without a high likeli-
hood of incurring antitrust liability. The antitrust laws are remarkably flexible 
in permitting joint activity. It is not true that our system claims that ''it is best 
that we keep companies apart from one another,'' as Prof. Jorde states. 36 
The antitrust laws, therefore, are not a large barrier to consortia forma-
tion. It is possible, as Professor Edward Rock of the University of Pennsylva-
nia told Congress last year, that firms fear the antitrust laws because they fear 
everything but absolute certainty. 37 The NCRA permits firms to work together 
in R&D, and proscribes activities beyond that. The courts and the Justice De-
partment are refining the standards applying to JPV s. In one way or another, all 
four reform bills would "clarify" these standards: the notification bills codify 
the existing rule ofreason, and H.R. 1024 replaces it with a new standard. This 
33The data on U.S. Memories' business plan is outlined in Sanford L. Kane, Remarks at the 
National Research Council Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Workshop on the Role 
of a U.S. DRAM Consortium in Revitalizing the U.S. Electronics Base 14 (June, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Workshop]. In 1988, American chipmakers sold 16.6 percent of world DRAMS, and 32 per-
cent of the DRAMs sold in America, but only 20 percent of I-megabit DRAMs. Assume that U.S. 
Memories would have the same relative impact on the American market as other American 
makers. In other words, assume that if U.S. Memories sold 16.6 percent of world 4-megabit 
DRAMs, it would account for 20-32 percent of the American market for 4-megabit DRAMs. If all 
else remained unchanged, and U.S. Memories sold 5-8 percent of world DRAMs, its share of the 
American market would be approximately 6-15 percent. Telephone conversation with Mr. Doug 
Andrey, Director of Industry Statistical Programs, Semiconductor Industry Association, Jan. 29, 
1990 (data from the research firm Dataquest). 
34Mr. Andrey quotes an industry "rule of thumb" that a chipmaker must spend $200 million 
for each 1 percent of the world DRAM market that it wishes to obtain, which translates to a market 
share for U.S. Memories at the bottom end of Mr. Kane's estimate. Telephone conversation with 
Mr. Doug Andrey, supra note 33. For a discussion of computer executives' fears, see This Will 
Surely Come Back to Haunt Us, supra note 26, at 73. 
35U .S. Memories' backers did not assume that the venture would dominate the DRAM market. 
Indeed, the assumption was quite the opposite, that the venture's production of DRAMs would 
catalyze that of existing makers, not replace it in monopolistic fashion. See Workshop, supra note 
33, at4. 
36Jorde, supra note 8, at 18 (internal quote omitted). This, of course, is what Rep. Gore had in 
mind in 1983 when he told Mr. Olson that MCC could form without violating the antitrust laws. See 
note 20 supra. 
37May 17 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at5-6 (testimony of Prof. Edward R. Rock, Univ. 
of Pennsylvania). 
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would reward corporations for their inability to understand standards that are 
not all that ambiguous. 
Rep. Campbell, a former antitrust law professor, offers a more sophisti-
cated argument. If two firms seek to merge, they can learn in advance whether 
their conduct is permissible. They would apply to the Justice Department and 
the Federal Trade Commission, which decide whether the venture may pro-
ceed. If we can decide that in advance, says Campbell, why can't we decide 
whether firms can co-manufacture? After all, joint production unites firms less 
than an outright merger. Why should it be subject to the flexible ''rule of rea-
son" analysis, which makes firms squeamish?38 
Beside the fact that the emerging "safe harbor" analysis would treat JPVs 
like mergers, there are problems with the analogy. Estimating a JPV's impact 
in advance relies heavily on input from the venturers themselves about their 
business plans, which is more uncertain and suspect than data that merging 
firms submit. The government would have to set up a new bureaucracy to re-
view the filings, leading to concerns about fairness and efficiency, although 
expanding the Department of Justice Antitrust Division to do the review would 
produce some economies of scale. Companies that feared a JPV, but that were 
unaware of the Justice Department proceedings, would have no input. Even if 
the process worked, would it be anything more than a rubber stamp? The 1980s 
saw few challenges to mergers. In the transportation industry, for example, 
airline mergers have led to a high degree of industry concentration, and higher 
fares. 39 
In a comprehensive analysis of the need for strategic coordination, Prof. 
Jorde makes an excellent point: firms need to work together in ways that en-
courage creativity and innovation.40 Yet these "alliances" have different im-
pacts on the marketplace. Mergers and joint ventures are different. Typically, 
mergers bring together two firms with established products and known market 
shares. It is feasible to calculate the merger's quantitative effect by using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index calculation. JPVs bring firms into new markets, 
or make an unquantifiable splash in existing markets. The antitrust standards 
should be somewhat different because we must wait to assess a venture's im-
pact.41 
Because the courts are treating joint ventures like mergers already, the 
standards are not all that different, except that joint venturers cannot get a green 
light in advance.42 That cautionary approach is appropriate. "Streamlining" 
38See id. at 2 (statement of Hon. Tom Campbell). 
39/d. at 11 (testimony of Prof. Edward R. Rock). 
40Jorde, supra note 8, at 20-26. See also the discussion of "technology by diversity," infra 
notes 57-63 and accompanying text. 
41Courts have begun to recognize that joint ventures are separate enterprises that create new 
productive capacity, new technology, new products, or that enter new markets. See, e.g., COM-
PACT v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1574 (M.D. Tenn. 1984). 
42See, Jorde, supra note 8, at 65, n. 182 (discussing the converging approaches to mergers and 
joint ventures). 
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the antitrust laws, in Rep. Campbell's words, to make a decision in advance 
whether a JPV may proceed resembles looking at the scoreboard before the 
buzzer sounds to end the game. Handing out antitrust immunity to JPV s would 
make the government determine whether conduct is appropriate, without the 
benefit of marketplace feedback. There is some evidence that consortia might 
have a negative impact on the marketplace. In their testimony before Congress, 
several small firms' CEOs stated that the competitive threat might be new ven-
tures themselves.43 One must take this with a grain of salt; remember, in the 
forest, the lowly worm fears notthe tiger, but the bird. Still, a consortium could 
engage in proscribed conduct. 
H.R. 1024 would allow aggrieved parties to seek injunctions to stop JPVs 
at any time. Prof. Jorde says that would be sufficient, because, ''The effects of 
most cooperative innovation arrangements, which rarely involve price or terri-
tory agreements, are not ordinarily difficult to detect. " 44 But his conclusion 
that there is "no reason" why firms should not be able to "agree on many 
things" rings hollow. It may be too late by the time competitors wake up and 
smell the coffee. JPVs will inevitably discuss pricing and marketing.45 The po-
tential for price-fixing and market domination grows as a company moves 
closer to the marketplace. It is impossible to manufacture television sets with-
out making decisions about their selling price and potential market. That's why 
the N CRA stopped short of extending protection to JPV s. Recognizing the dan-
ger of monopolization, Congress excluded marketing and pricing activities not 
"reasonably required to conduct the research and development" from the 
NCRA's protection.46 
IV. WHEN THE HUNTERS ARE ALREADY 
IN THE FOREST ... 
Balanced against the potential negative impacts is the possibility that anti-
trust reform would encourage American firms to form beneficial strategic alli-
ances, which they presently do far less often than do their counterparts in other 
countries, particularly those in Japan and Western Europe. Prof. Jorde points 
out that in Japan, ''cooperation and competition are inextricably linked,'' and 
43See Sept. 28 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (testimony of David R. Coelho, Chairman 
and Founder, Vantage Analysis Systems, Inc); id. (testimony of Louis R. Tomasetta, President 
and CEO, Vitesse Semiconductor Corp). A former Justice Department official recently asked, 
''Are we better off in the Jong run with mavericks, or are we better off circling the wagons? ... 
The downside is that whoever has got the maverick technology has lost out.'' Lipsky, More Com-
petitors Tum to Cooperation, Wall St. J., June 23, 1989, at BJ. 
44Jorde, supra note 8, at 49. 
45See, e.g., U.S. v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Brodsky, Joint Ven-
tures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1523, 1552 (1982), quoted in May 17 Judiciary 
Hearing, supra note 3, at 8 (testimony of Prof. Edward R. Rock) (''if the arrangement is allowed to 
operate at all, the parents, through their representatives in the joint venture, will necessarily agree 
on prices and output. ... "). 
4615 u.s.c. § 430l(b)(l) (1982). 
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he provides a detailed outline of the catalytic role of the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) in targeting industries for expansion and co- . 
ordinating research and development. MITI, says Jorde, ''acts simultaneously 
as cheerleader, champion, and coordinator" in R&D. 47 
Many believe this targeted approach alters free market dynamics. Jack 
Kuehler told Congress that it gives Japanese companies freedom to value long 
term objectives over superior quarterly results. "Japanese companies," he 
said, ''are allowed-even encouraged-to pursue the kinds oflong term strate-
gies that justify these massive investments. " 48 In 1989, technology publica-
tions featured articles on long-term Japanese partnerships in new technologies 
such as superconductivity and HDTV. There's no doubt that the Japanese are 
participants in many of these technologies for the long haul. 
In the U.S., the NCRA has yielded relatively few joint ventures, the larg-
est of which are Sematech and two electronics consortia, the Microelectronics 
and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) and Semiconductor Research 
Corporation (SRC).49 The MCC has trouble attracting key technologists from 
its member companies, and earned a low grade from Fortune in June, 1989, for 
its scaled-down projects. It has made progress since then in areas such as com-
puter software, but has yet to demonstrate a synergy that would justify its exis-
tence. Even Sematech, although an initial success, may not get its 4-megabit 
chip production line on track ahead of global competitors; its projected comple-
tion date has already slipped by six months. 
Prof. Jorde claims our relative lack of cooperation is largely attributable to 
the antitrust laws, which are arguably more restrictive than those of Japan and 
Western Europe. I think it stems more from our societal preference for compe-
tition and short-term positive results. American firms may consider the anti-
trust laws when they decide whether or not to cooperate, but the driving force is 
competition. As Prof. Rock states, we are not the Japanese, and we have fol-
lowed the competitive "model" for many years. 50 We should not do what the 
Japanese do merely because it's successful. When the hunters are in the forest 
and shooting, it's not the best time to be wondering where they got their rifles. 
And the rifles, whatever their origin, are expensive. A new semiconductor 
chip factory may cost as much as $500 million. As noted above, U.S. Memo-
ries estimated that its start-up costs would have been approximately $1 billion. 
IBM says it spent at least that much in developing and building its new ''Ad-
vanced Semiconductor Technology Center'' in East Fishkill, New York. Small 
companies may find it hard to raise that kind of capital, meaning that companies 
must work together in new technologies. Does that mean that we should follow 
47Jorde, supra note 8, at 27-30. 
48Sept. 28 Judiciary Hearing. supra note 3, at 4 (testimony of Jack D. Kuehler, President of 
IBM). 
49 Although approximately 130 ventures have registered under the NCRA, many did so just 
after the law was passed, and many of those were existing ventures. Even Prof. Jorde calls the 
number of joint ventures "disappointing." Jorde, supra note 8, at 53. 
50May 17 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at 9 (testimony of Edward R. Rock). 
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the Japanese model of central planning by the government? Except in wartime, 
our experiments with it have been abject failures. The more appealing route is 
for the government to act as a promoter, spurring on industries. 
To deal with our competitors, we must solve our own problems first. Mr. 
Prestowitz, Rep. Campbell, and others say the antitrust laws, now over one 
hundred years old, were tailored to promote domestic competition, and are thus 
outdated. Under today's exigencies, they say, the federal government should 
tailor its antitrust laws to the problem at hand. As Rep. Campbell states, ''What 
is needed is a streamlined procedure to give American competitors the assur-
ance they need to compete effectively in the production and marketing of prod-
ucts in America and around the world.' •S• Yet even he acknowledges that a cen-
tral goal of the antitrust laws, curbing the impact on American consumers of 
price-fixing and joint marketing, is as valid today as it was in 1890.52 
This reflects an ongoing tension in the antitrust laws. Courts have moved 
toward emphasizing economic efficiency as a goal of the antitrust laws.s3 Many 
horizontal and vertical agreements that do not result in concentrations of mar-
ket power are, as a result, virtually exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 54 A JPV that 
results in a concentrated market may even be "efficient," in the economist's 
sense, particularly in an industry characterized by production scale economies 
and high entry costs. But a theoretically "efficient" arrangement may not dis-
tribute its benefits to the group that presumably is the center of the "competi-
tiveness" fuss: America's consumers. Pricing and marketing decisions made 
without the spur of competition would leave consumers worse off. Consumers 
must have a choice, and there is no reason to abandon the historic focus of the 
antitrust laws on prohibiting price-fixing and joint marketing. ss 
Therefore, Washington cannot respond on the basis of "competitiveness" 
alone. That tells us little about the impact of its policies on the marketplace. 
s•ld. at I (testimony of Hon. Tom Campbell). 
s2/d. (testimony of Hon. Tom Campbell) ("The mere claim of joint production of an invention 
should not be used as a cover for price-fixing or other anticompetitive behavior."). 
s3See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. (1982). 
54See, e.g., Rothery Storage and Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 
1986), cert. den., 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987) (opinion by Bork, J., holding that a horizontal combina-
tion that led to a market share of 6 percent was efficient). There is a vigorous minority that argues 
economic efficiency should not be a paramount aim of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Rothery, 792 
F.2d at 230 (Wald, J., concurring). Given the present makeup of the federal bench, there is no 
reason to expect that the balance of power will shift in the near future. 
ssSince many JPVs would not dominate the American market, it is also unnecessary to change 
the "relevant market" for innovation. H.R. 1024 provides that the market for high-tech products is 
global. Rep. Campbell argues since high-tech competition is global, its market is as well. The "rel-
evant market" concept is based on the ease of substitution. See generally, L. SULLIVAN, ANTI-
TRUST,§ 12.41 (1977). Some high-tech products are not globally interchangeable. Redefining the 
"relevant market" does have political appeal: Dr. Solomon Buchsbaum of AT&T Bell Labs told 
Congress that, ''Companies don't compete; countries compete.'' HDTV Hearing, supra note 7, at 
227. Assuming a global market for innovation would give JPVs an advantage that might be down-
right pernicious: if the ''relevant market'' is global, a JPV could legally monopolize the American 
market. 
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Even the most ardent proponents of economic efficiency imply that some ven-
tures may fix prices or manipulate output. 56 
V. TECHNOLOGY BY DIVERSITY: A LOOK AT THE BILLS 
BEFORE CONGRESS 
One can view JPVs as a uniquely American response to Japanese central 
planning and coordination. Mr. Prestowitz said of U.S. Memories that, "In a 
sense [it] is a way of replicating the lower risk and lower cost of capital that the 
Japanese gain through their integration .... '' 57 American innovation has taken 
that path often, with entrepreneurs mimicking the successes of foreign firms in 
an American way. The rise of the American textile industry in the 1800s is one 
historical example. 
Besides the tendency toward "replication," another characteristic of 
American firms is a deep-seated preference for competition and independence. 
If there are substantial advantages to cooperation, some American firms will 
resist it nevertheless. Some firms will think thatJPVs are appropriate, but some 
will believe it best to control their own destiny. Americans are proud individu-
alists. It is uncommon for us to put all our eggs in one basket. When it comes to 
innovation, we are a nation of hens: we lay a lot of eggs, sit on top of them, and 
see which one hatches first. 
It is not that small is always beautiful. Upon hearing of the demise of U.S. 
Memories, Mr. Rodgers said it was a victory for smaller companies, which he 
believes innovate faster, cheaper, and better. But that may not be true. Al-
though small companies are flexible innovators on a small scale, they face fi-
nancial and other hurdles to competing in the high-tech arena on a broad scale. 
The antitrust laws, therefore, should not draw the limit of market power to fa-
vor smaller firms at the expense of larger firms, or vice versa. Rather, they 
should encourage diversity. We need to nurture a lot of eggs (both small and 
large) in order to hatch the best chickens. This, it seems, is something the em-
erging "safe harbor" trend is already encouraging. 58 
H.R. 1024 discourages diversity. Its certification procedure, which as-
sesses the outcome on the basis of early evidence, will deter other entrants in a 
technology sector. Once a JPV with antitrust immunity enters the picture, other 
56See, e.g., Rothery, 792 F.2d at 217. 
57Re-Entry Vehicle, supra note 22, at Al. 
58In view of the changing law, "diversity" no longer means that firms must work in a decen-
tralized and uncoordinated industry. Small firms and larger joint ventures may co-exist, and in-
deed, that may be the most desirable way to proceed. Our limited experience with joint ventures 
suggests that brilliant breakthroughs are not always the product of consensus. See the discussion of 
joint ventures under the NCRA, supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also No Thanks for 
Memories, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1990, at Al4 ("Consortia rarely are very nimble"). Also, as Pro-
fessor Rock notes, the one joint venture that led to a Supreme Court case ended in failure. May 17 
Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at 9 (testimony of Prof. Edward R. Rock) (citing U.S. v. Penn-
Olin, 378 U.S. 158 (1964)). 
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entrants will find it difficult to proceed. In the third Judiciary Committee hear-
ing, a Silicon Valley CEO asked why "any venture capitalist [would] want to 
put this money behind a start-up in any technology" in which a JPV was a 
player. 59 Certification, as its proponents intend, would eliminate the antitrust 
risks of entry into new technologies. Those firms either left out or voluntarily 
opting out of a JPV "blessed" by the Justice Department still face those risks, 
and one wonders whether they would assume them. The result would be a de-
crease in the number of firms, small or large, trying to make something of a 
new technology. 
By contrast, extending the NCRA's protection to JPVs would not deter 
new entrants. Under a notification regime, a registrant's advantages are not 
substantial; the most significant advantage would be the detrebling of damages 
in a lawsuit. Our experience to date with the NCRA shows that when one ven-
ture registers, it hardly inhibits others from doing so. In areas such as electron-
ics, there have been multiple registrations. In addition, judicial relief is still 
available to curb excesses, so a notification system has none of the trappings of 
"picking winners and losers." Extending the NCRA's notification process 
would not punish firms if they choose not to enter a JPV, as they can still sue it 
for damages. 
Certification, besides deterring entry, may inhibit the formation of JPVs. 
Companies may not take advantage of certification, because they do not want to 
deal with the bureaucracy and paperwork. It is not the hassle that is the real 
fear; it's that companies would have to yield their secrets, both trade secrets 
and others. Rep. Campbell argues that the ventures will put up with that public-
ity. That's true; some will. However, other companies used to "going their 
own way" are likely to be uncomfortable with the idea of displaying their 
wares for the world to see before they're even produced.6() In a notification sys-
tem, by contrast, a registrant discloses little about its activities, and there is no 
barrier to joint venture formation. 
Because firms can form JPVs of a considerable size already, extending 
the NCRA's protection to them is not absolutely necessary. Still, the 
NCRA's tradeoff of detrebling damages in return for the information re-
vealed by registering does make sense, if price-fixing and joint marketing 
remain illegal. The treble damages provision gives plaintiffs an incentive to 
ferret out anticompetitive conduct. 61 A registrant makes it public knowledge 
that it will engage in joint production. Anticompetitive conduct, although 
neither unlikely (as noted earlier) nor simple to detect, would be easier to 
find. Plaintiffs would not need the incentive of treble damages, as the venture 
59Sept. 28 Judiciary Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (testimony of David R. Coelho). 
6()See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cen. 
den., 100 S. Ct. 1061, 1062 (1980)(opinion by Justices Rehnquist and Powell denying cer-
tiorari)(' 'To one not schooled in the niceties of antitrust litigation, the notion that a statute designed 
to foster competition requires one competitor to disclose to another, in advance of marketing a 
product to the general public, its plan to introduce the new product, is difficult to fathom."). 
61Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
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would already be scrutinized. Rep. Campbell and others argue that ventures 
would still spend time, money, and effort defending their conduct in antitrust 
lawsuits. In the first five years under the NCRA, to the best of my knowledge, 
few if any research ventures have been challenged. The spectre of "strike 
suits'' by plaintiffs hoping to ''put ventures out of business'' is illusory. Anti-
trust suits are expensive to prosecute for all but the most well-heeled plain-
tiffs, making the availability of treble damages almost mandatory for a plain-
tiff to be able financially to proceed. 
The act of notification should give no blessing to price-fixing and joint 
marketing. Of the three major reform bills, only H.R. 2664 (Rep. Fish's bill) 
prevents joint marketing, and if H. R. 1025 is the legislative vehicle, it should 
be modified accordingly. In their current form, however, all four bills have 
another problem. None of them limits participation in JPVs to American 
companies, so foreign companies could participate just as easily. If one goal 
of antitrust reform is to improve America's ''competitiveness,'' Congress 
should remove that loophole. Yet in this decade of internationalization, the 
lines between'' American'' companies and others have become blurred. For-
eign companies own much of the stock of some "American" companies. 
Some "foreign" companies produce their products in the U.S., and some 
''American'' companies go offshore to do so. The result is a tangle of defini-
tions of a' 'United States company.' ' 62 A better solution is for any legislative 
vehicle on antitrust reform to confine its application to companies, American 
or not, that are willing to produce some products in the U.S. with American 
labor. 
The political reality is that a notification-based bill has the best chance of 
success. 
63 It is also the best policy. More extensive changes to the antitrust laws 
are unnecessary because many ventures can produce together legally. If we re-
vise the antitrust laws because businesses perceive the need for it, or because 
we cannot reduce the deficit, or even because we want to have an industrial 
policy that tilts in favor of emerging joint ventures, we move away from our 
62In a lengthy hearing last fall, a subcommittee of the Science, Space, and Technology Com-
mittee heard conflicting testimony on this subject. What ls a U.S. Company?: Hearing Before the 
Subcommi11ee on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Commi11ee on Science, Space, 
and Technology, IOI st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
63The Bush administration has resolved its internal conflict, agreeing recently to promote a 
notification approach to antitrust reform. See ''Bush Aides Urge Antitrust Restrictions Be Eased for 
U.S. Firms' Joint Ventures," supra note 28, at A4. Any approach to antitrust reform will have to 
pass muster with Rep. Brooks, who is both the chairman of the full Judiciary Committee and of the 
subcommittee that is considering the reform bills. While he has chaired the three hearings to date, 
Rep. Brooks has not yet begun to mark up a reform bill. He may also favor a bill that limits its 
application to ''American'' companies. Moreover, Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Oh), who chairs 
the Senate Judiciary Committee's antitrust subcommittee, is known to oppose reform. Recently, 
the team of business lobbies that originally backed H.R. 1024 retreated, putting out a paper sup-
porting the notification approach. Rep. Campbell understands this. He is a freshman member of the 
minority party, with an idea that, while provocative, has not garnered wide support. It has, how-
ever, received a more thorough hearing than the legislative proposals of most first-term Represen-
tatives, demonstrating Rep. Campbell's promise as a legislator. 
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traditional focus on innovation by diversity toward the paternalism of 
"Bambi" (and the likelihood of concentrated market power). If ventures are 
willing to publicize their activities, then they should be able to avail themselves 
of the detrebling of damages in antitrust lawsuits. Any more change than that 
would be unnecessary and counterproductive. 
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